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This paper examines the role played by internal control and its five components (i.e., control 
environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring) in 
alleviating future stock price crash risk. Using a unique dataset from China, we find evidence that internal 
control is negatively associated with future stock price crash risk. Specifically, control environment and 
monitoring are significantly and negatively associated with future stock price crash risk. Moreover, the 
negative association between internal control and crash risk is significantly more pronounced in firms 
with weak internal and external governance (i.e., audited by non-Big 4 auditors, located in provinces with 
low market development, and less conservative in accounting) and with poor ability to mitigate impacts of 
extreme negative events (i.e., non-state-owned enterprises). Our study highlights the delicate role of 
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Internal Control and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from China 
1. Introduction 
Corporate scandals and auditing failures, such as those of Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom, have 
motivated regulators to address the effectiveness of internal corporate controls. For example, Section 404 
of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX 404) requires public U.S. companies to disclose information on internal 
controls. Numerous studies examine how internal control weakness (ICW) is associated with the first and 
second moments of return distribution (i.e., average return, cost of capital, idiosyncratic risk, or 
systematic risk).
1
 Few studies examine how internal control affects stock price crash risk (hereafter, crash 
risk), which is regarded as the third moment of stock returns. Crash risk is a large negative market-
adjusted stock returns (Hutton et al., 2009; Jin and Myers, 2006) and is an undesirable characteristic of a 
firm for investors. More importantly, we know little about how the five components of internal control 
proposed by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) affect 
crash risk. This study investigates these important and unexplored research issues. 
We investigate whether firms with better internal control mechanisms are less prone to price crash. 
According to COSO, internal control has five components, namely, control environment, risk assessment, 
control activities, information and communication, and monitoring. Prior studies document that control 
environment and information and communication reduce earnings management and enhance the quality 
of corporate disclosure (Chen, Dong, Han, and Zhou 2013). Therefore, the control environment as well as 
information and communication can limit the ability of corporate insiders to withhold bad news, which 
lowers crash risk. Moreover, risk assessment helps managers evaluate risk accurately, thus preventing 
them from taking extreme risk, which leads to lower crash risk. Control activities help ensure that 
necessary actions are taken to address risks that may hinder firms from achieving their objectives. Such 
events eventually help reduce the probability of an extreme negative event, which is one of the most 
                                                          
1
 For example, Ogneva, Subramanyam, and Raghunandan (2007), Hammersley, Myers and Shakespeare (2008), and 
Beneish, Billings and Hodder (2008). 
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important triggers of price crash. Finally, monitoring means assessing the performance of the internal 
control system over time to ensure that the system functions well. Thus, monitoring strengthens the 
effects of the other four components of internal control on crash risk. In summary, we predict that internal 
control and its five components reduce crash risk. 
Our measure of internal control is the internal control index developed by China’s Xiamen 
University. This index has been published annually in the three most influential financial newspapers in 
China: China Securities Journal, Shanghai Securities News, and Securities Times. The index is widely 
used and cited by media, auditors, listed companies, and scholars in China.
2
 The internal control index is 
constructed by tracking the internal control information of a firm using financial statements, China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) filings, government documents, and press releases. The index 
covers fully 99% of all of Chinese public firms from 2007 to 2010. More important, this index is further 
decomposed into the five sub-indexes of control environment, risk assessment, control activities, 
information and communication, and monitoring, thus enabling us to evaluate the strength of the five 
dimensions of internal control. Crash risk is proxied by the probability of extreme, negative firm-specific 
returns and the negative skewness of firm-specific returns (Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2001 and Kim, Li and 
Zhang, 2011a). We use a sample of Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
from 2007 to 2010 to conduct our analysis. 
Our findings suggest that internal control is significantly and negatively related to crash risk. 
Moreover, we document that the control environment component is negatively correlated with our two 
crash risk measures. Monitoring and information and communication components are significantly and 
negatively associated with one of the two crash risk measures. Risk assessment and control activities 
components are not significant with respect to any crash risk measures. That is, not every component of 
internal control has equal impact on the crash risk of a firm. 
                                                          
2
 For example, the corporate governance center of Deloitte cites the internal control index on its website (see: 
http://www.corpgov.deloitte.com/site/chinazh/; accessed on May 24, 2015).  
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In addition, we investigate whether the negative association between internal control and crash risk is 
affected by internal and external monitoring, the ability to limit bad news hoarding, and the ability to 
mitigate the effects of extreme negative events. We find that the negative association between internal 
control and crash risk is significant (insignificant) when firms have weak (strong) internal and external 
governance (i.e., when audited by non-Big Four auditors or located in a province with low market 
development, respectively), weak (strong) ability to limit bad news hoarding (i.e., with less accounting 
conservatism), or weak (strong) ability to mitigate the effects of extreme negative events (i.e., non-state-
owned enterprises (non-SOEs)). These results are consistent with the notion that the role of internal 
control in lowering crash risk is particularly important when internal monitoring by an auditor or external 
monitoring by the market is weak, when firms’ ability to limit bad news hoarding is weak, or when firms’ 
ability to mitigate the effect of extreme negative events is poor (i.e., non-SOEs). The results address a 
potential concern that the negative association between internal control and crash risk may be the 
outcome of corporate governance. We find that the negative association between internal control and 
crash risk exists only in firms with weak governance (i.e., low auditing quality and weak market 
development). Thus, the negative association between internal control and crash risk is not driven by 
firms with both good internal control and good corporate governance. Overall, this study supports the 
view that internal control limits the ability of managers to conceal bad news and helps reduce the 
probability of extreme negative events, which lower crash risk. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study to examine the third moment effects on internal control and its five components. We offer 
evidence that internal control and some of the five components are important determinants of crash risk. 
More importantly, the study reveals that control environment, monitoring, and information and 
communication are the three important components of internal control in reducing crash risk. This finding 
is particularly important because investors pay attention to the probability of extreme outcomes (Pan, 
2002). Second, SOX 404 requires public U.S. companies to disclose information on internal controls and 
get their internal controls evaluated by their auditors. However, U.S. studies provide mixed results on the 
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relation between ICW and crash risk. Zhou, Kim, and Yeung (2014) document that firms with ICW are 
more prone to crash than those without ICW. In contrast, Kim and Zhang (2014) find that ICW does not 
predict realized crash risk. Our study finds that internal controls help reduce crash risk, generating 
additional empirical evidence to support the regulation
3
. Third, our study documents that internal and 
external monitoring mechanisms, a firm’s ability to limit bad news hoarding, and its ability to assuage the 
effects of extreme negative events influence the association between internal control quality and crash 
risk. This finding suggests that internal control can function well in reducing crash risk when strong 
internal and external monitoring are unavailable, when firm ability to limit bad news hoarding is weak, 
and when firms poorly mitigate the effects of extreme negative events. Finally, our study provides an 
important policy implication to securities market regulators. Our results suggest that internal control, 
especially its control environment, monitoring, and information and communication elements, plays an 
important role in determining crash risk and/or maintaining stability in the capital markets. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the 
research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection and specifies the research design. Section 4 
describes the data and presents descriptive statistics and empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
This study relates to two streams of the literature: (1) research that examines the determinants of 
crash risk, and (2) research that investigates the economic consequences of internal control. We briefly 
review these two streams and subsequently develop our research hypotheses. 
                                                          
3
 We conjecture that there at least three reasons that could lead to different findings from Kim and Zhang (2014). 
First, the proxy of internal control quality in the two US studies is a dummy variable, while ours is a continuous 
variable which could lead to more powerful tests. Second, our data comes from China, an emerging market with 
weaker legal institutions, poorer corporate governance environment, and less experience in risk management 
compared with the U.S. Thus, the marginal effects of internal control quality on crash risk might be greater in China, 
which makes us easier to detect the effects of internal control on crash risk. Third, as pointed out by Kim and Zhang 
(2014; p. 856): “In untabulated tests, we find that ICW does not predict future realized crashes. This does not 
necessarily mean that ICW does not increase future crash risk; it may simply be that internal control-driven crashes 
have not materialized yet. More importantly, it does not mean that ICW does not increase investors’ fear of future 
crash risk.” Therefore, it’s possible that internal control-driven crashes exist in both the U.S. and China. 
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2.1 Determinants of crash risk 
The risk of stock price crash is the probability of extreme negative stock returns for a specific period, 
normally one year (Jin and Myers, 2006; Kim, Li and Zhang, 2011a, b). Securities regulators and 
investors have been paying attention to research on crash risk since several corporate frauds occurred in 
the early 2000s. This topic became even more important after the financial crisis of 2008, thus driving 
several researchers to investigate the determinants of crash risk. 
Jin and Myers (2006) build a model in which outsiders have limited information to analyze the 
behavior of managers withholding bad news, which leads to stock price crash. At the end of the fiscal 
year, managers must pay sufficient dividends to meet the expectations of investors, or they may face 
termination. If a company performs poorly, managers may withhold this bad news until the dividend 
payment meets the expectations of investors. However, when bad news accumulates beyond a threshold, 
managers give up withholding it, and all the bad news is released. Such an event leads to stock price crash 
and extreme values on the left of the stock return distribution. Consistent with their prediction, Jin and 
Myers (2006) find that bad news is less likely to be withheld in a country with higher information 
transparency, which lowers crash risk. 
Consistent with Jin and Myers (2006), Hutton, Marcus and Tehranian (2009) document a negative 
association between corporate transparency and crash risk at the firm level. Their findings indicate that 
the association between information transparency and crash risk disappeared after SOX was implemented 
in 2002, because of strong monitoring. Building on prior theoretical and empirical research, several 
researchers have begun to study the firm-level determinants of crash risk, such as tax avoidance, 
CEO/CFO compensation, accounting conservatism, and institutional investors (Kim, Li and Zhang, 
2011a, b; Callen and Fang, 2013; Kim and Zhang, 2015). Kim, Li and Zhang (2011b) find that tax 
avoidance facilitates managers’ misbehavior that lead to higher future crash risk, such as rent seeking and 
withholding bad news. Moreover, these authors document that external monitoring mechanisms, such as 
analyst following and institutional investors, help restrain the behavior of managers, thus decreasing crash 
risk. Kim, Li and Zhang (2011a) expect that equity compensation motivates managers to withhold bad 
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news, which leads to higher crash risk. Kim and Zhang (2015) report that accounting conservatism, that 
is, setting a higher degree of verification to recognize good news as gains rather than to recognize bad 
news as losses, can lower crash risk. Callen and Fang (2013) show that institutional investors provide 
monitoring, lowering firm crash risk. To illustrate bad news hoarding and crash risk of a firm, we present 
two separate cases in China in Appendix A. The first case is Chongqing Brewer, whose stock price 
dropped more than 40% over the period December 9 to December 14, 2011, after a report surfaced on its 
illegal transfer of shares of its subsidiary to two scientists in December 2005. The second case is Yili 
Group (a dairy product company), whose stock price fell sharply and hit an all-time low on September 17, 
2008 after news reports that suppliers of milk had been adding a toxic chemical so as to disguise dilution 
of milk. Some believe that executives of Yili Group were aware of the practice of adding the toxic 
chemical before the news broke; several of these executives received jail time. Both cases suggest that 
when hidden bad news is eventually revealed to the public, stock price crashes. For Chongqing Brewer, 
the unveiling of bad news is endogenous, while in Yili Group, the source of bad news is exogenous. 
Such empirical and anecdotal evidence supports the view that hiding bad news eventually triggers 
stock price crash. To our best knowledge, no prior research investigates the effect of internal control 
components as an important mechanism in preventing the bad news withholding behavior of managers in 
relation to crash risk. 
 
2.2 Economic consequences of internal control 
Several previous studies investigate the economic consequences of internal control by exploiting 
SOX 404 disclosure as a research setting. Specifically, several studies document that firms with ICW are 
charged a higher cost of equity (Ogneva, Subramanyam and Raghunandan, 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2009), public debt (Dhaliwal et al., 2011), and private debt (Kim, Song and Zhang, 2011) than those 
without ICW. Kim, Yeung and Zhou (2014) examine the effect of ICW on crash risk and document that 
firms with ICW are more prone to crash than those without ICW. 
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The ICW literature primarily focuses on whether a firm has ICW or not.  That is, ICW is a dummy 
variable.  The findings from the literature are for firms with or without ICW. Therefore, the internal 
control measure used by prior literature is only a crude one. It is not clear about the impact of internal 
control magnitude on a specific issue. Our study uses a unique database on a continuous measure of 
internal control to investigate directly the association between the magnitude of internal control and crash 
risk. In addition, most studies on internal control have been conducted in the U.S. Thus, the 
generalizability of their conclusions to other countries, especially emerging economies, remains unknown. 
Our study focuses on China, where internal control may play an important role because strong internal 
and external monitoring mechanisms are scarce. Moreover, prior studies do not provide evidence on how 
the five components of internal control identified by COSO relate to crash risk. We use a unique database 
to measure the five components of internal control to investigate the effects of these components on crash 
risk. 
 
2.3 Hypothesis development 
The above discussion indicates that internal control is a mechanism that reduces information 
asymmetry and increases information transparency. Internal control reasonably ensures the effectiveness 
and efficiency of business, reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with laws and regulations 
(COSO, 1992). COSO identifies five components of internal control. The internal control system and its 
five components may restrain crash risk because they conceptually reduce the likelihood of executives 
hiding bad news. We analyze the effects of these five components on crash risk. 
The control environment is the overall attitude, awareness, and actions of directors and managers 
regarding the internal control system and its importance to the entity. The control environment sets the 
tone of an organization and influences the control consciousness of people in the organization. The 
control environment can be reflected in internal control processes and requirements, ethical values, 
corporate culture, philosophy, operating style, organizational structure, and human resources policies and 
procedures. The control environment is the foundation for the remaining four components of internal 
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control, because it provides discipline, principles, and structure for the organization. Thus, a good control 
environment helps prevent bad news hoarding. 
Information and communication disclose operational, financial, and compliance-related information, 
which is important to running and controlling the business. Information and communication address not 
only communication within the organization, but also with outsiders, such as customers, suppliers, 
regulators, and shareholders. Prior studies document that the control environment and information and 
communication can reduce earnings management and increase the quality of corporate disclosure (Chen 
et al., 2013). Therefore, the control environment and information and communication can prevent insiders 
from withholding bad news, leading to lower crash risk. 
Risk assessment identifies and analyzes the relevant risks of achieving the firm’s objectives, which 
form a basis for risk management. Firms suffering from macro-level, industry-level, and firm-specific 
risks should identify and manage potential and existing risks. Risk assessment helps companies control 
the risks they take and avoid extreme risk-taking behavior. Accordingly, risk assessment can lead to lower 
crash risk. 
Control activities help ensure that corporate policies are enforced. Control activities exist throughout 
the organization at all levels and in all functions. Control activities are varied, including approvals, 
authorizations, verifications, reconciliations, reviews of operating performance, security of assets, and 
segregation of duties. Thus, we expect that control activities will reduce the probability of an extreme 
event, which is one of the most important triggers of stock price crash. 
Monitoring assesses the performance of internal control systems through ongoing surveillance 
activities, separate evaluations, or a combination of the two. Ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of 
operations and includes regular management, supervisory activities, and other actions. Internal control 
deficiencies are reported upstream through monitoring. Serious issues are reported to top managers and 
the corporate board. Monitoring ensures the function of the other four components of internal control and 
informs managers of internal control deficiencies, allowing them to take action to correct them in time. 
11 
 
Among the five components of internal control, control environment, monitoring, information and 
communication are more macro-level, direct, and presumably have more direct impact on a firm’s internal 
control; thus, we expect them to be more relevant in controlling bad news withholding. Risk assessment 
and control activities, while still important in internal control, relate to more micro-level and piece-wide 
components of internal control. Therefore, these activities may or may not be relevant in curtailing 
executive hoarding of bad news. Overall, we expect that internal control can mitigate crash risk through 
controlling bad news withholding activities, but different components of internal control may differ in 
strength of mitigating bad news withholding, and thus crash risk. Based on the above discussion, we 
propose the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: The quality of internal control is negatively associated with crash risk, ceteris paribus. 
H1a: The quality of control environment is negatively associated with crash risk, ceteris paribus. 
H1b: The quality of information and communication is negatively associated with crash risk, ceteris 
paribus. 
H1c: The quality of risk assessment is negatively associated with crash risk, ceteris paribus. 
H1d: The quality of control activities is negatively associated with crash risk, ceteris paribus. 
H1e: The quality of monitoring is negatively associated with crash risk, ceteris paribus. 
 
3. Sample Selection and Research Design 
3.1 Sample data 
Our sample consists of all publically traded Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges from 2007 to 2010. We obtain all financial and stock market data from the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The internal control data are obtained from the 
internal control index database developed by the internal control research center of Xiamen University 
(Chen et al., 2013). Panel A of Table 1 shows that we exclude: (1) 204 observations from the financial 
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industry, (2) 124 observations that lack internal control data, and (3) 2,115 observations without data for 
control variables. Our final sample contains 8,495 firm-year observations. 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the distribution of our final sample by industry. Table 1 shows that 59.33% 
of our sample is clustered in the manufacturing industry, and only 0.40% of our sample is from the media 
and cultural industry. The distribution of our final sample by industry is similar to that in the CSMAR 
database, which indicates that our sample is unbiased. Panel C of Table 1 shows the distribution of our 
sample by year. Sample size increases steadily because of the expansion of Chinese capital markets 
during the sample period. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
3.2 Research model design 
3.2.1 Internal control measure 
We use the Chinese Internal Control Index, denoted by IC_INDEX, to measure the quality of internal 
control. The index
4
 is constructed by the Internal Control Research Center of Xiamen University. All 
firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and on the Main Section of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
are included. The final index covers 99% of all Chinese public firms from 2007 to 2010, with the other 1% 
missing necessary internal control information. The final index is constructed by tracking firms’ internal 
control information from financial statements, government documents, and press releases. We explain 
construction of the index in Appendix C. 
Chen et al. (2013) validate the internal control index by confirming the known relation between 
internal control quality and earnings management. They document a negative association between internal 
control quality and earnings management.  In addition, this index is published annually in the three most 
influential financial newspapers in Mainland China: China Securities Journal, Shanghai Securities News, 
                                                          
4
 Introduction of the internal control index can also be seen in the Internal Control Index (2009) for China’s Listed 
Companies: Formulation, Analysis and Evaluation as published in China Securities Journal and Shanghai 
Securities News and Establishing the Internal Control Evaluation System Meeting the Actual Situation in China as 
published in Securities Times both on June 11, 2010 and Internal Control Index (2010) for China’s Listed 
Companies: Formulation, Analysis and Evaluation published on September 6, 2011.  
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and Securities Times, and is widely used or cited by media, auditors, listed companies, and scholars in 
China. The values of IC_INDEX range from 0 to 1. A higher value of IC_INDEX corresponds to higher 
quality of internal control. The index comprehensively reflects the level of internal firm control. 
IC_INDEX is further separated into five components, namely, control environment (CtrEnv), risk 
assessment (Risk), control activities (CtrAct), information and communication (InfoCom), and monitoring 
(Monitor). The five sub-indexes describe the quality of the five components of internal control, with 
values ranging from 0 to 1. Similar to the IC_INDEX, a high value of a sub-index means better 
performance in the specific component. 
3.2.2 Measures of crash risk 
We use two measures of crash risk based on Chen, Hong and Stein (2001) and Kim, Li and Zhang 
(2011a,b). We first estimate firm-specific weekly return by regressing the following augmented market 
model for each firm in each year: 
                                                         (1) 
where  is return on firm i in week  and  is return on the CSMAR value-weighted market index 
over week . We include the lead and lag returns of the market index to allow for nonsynchronous 
trading (Dimson, 1979). The residual from Equation (1) captures firm-specific weekly return. We log-
transform these highly skewed residuals to obtain firm-specific weekly return, Wi,τ, which is the natural 
log of 1 plus the residual return from Equation (1). 
The first measure of crash risk is denoted by CRASH, which is equal to 1 if a firm experiences one or 
more firm-specific weekly returns (i.e., Wi,τ) falling under 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-
specific weekly returns for that fiscal year. This measure captures the probability of detecting extremely 
negative firm-specific weekly returns in a fiscal year. 
i, i 1,i m, -2 2,i m, -1 3,i m, 4,i m, +1 5,i m, +2 ,r = + r + r + r + r + r i            




Our second measure of crash risk, NCSKEW, is the negative of the third moment of firm-specific 
weekly returns. We calculate NCSKEW by taking the negative of the third moment of returns and dividing 
it by the standard deviation of returns raised to the third power. That is, for any firm i, in year t, 
                                                    (2) 
 where n is the number of observations of firm i–specific weekly returns during year t. 
3.2.3 Main model 
Our hypotheses focus on the effect of internal control on crash risk. We estimate the following 
model to test our hypotheses: 
PROXY_CRASH=β0+ β1IC_INDEX+ β2DTURNt-1+ β3NCSKEWt-1+ β4SIGMAt-1 
+ β5RETt-1+ β6SIZEt-1+ β7MBt-1+ β8LEVt-1+ β9ROAt-1+ β10ACCMt-1+ β11Zmijewskit-1 
+Industry + year + ξt                                                                                                                                                                                                 (3) 
where PROXY_CRASH is CRASHt and NCSKEWt, respectively. CRASHt is a dummy variable indicating 
whether there is a crash of stock price in a specific fiscal year for the firm. NCSKEWt is the negative 
coefficient of skewness. IC_INDEXt is the Chinese Internal Control Index. Based on prior research, we 
control for several firm characteristics that affect the risk of price crash. DTURNt-1 is the difference 
between average monthly share turnover over the fiscal year and that over the previous fiscal year. This 
variable reflects investor heterogeneity and is expected to be positively associated with crash risk (Chen, 
Hong and Stein, 2001; Kim, Li and Zhang, 2011a, b). NCSKEWt-1 is lagged NCSKEWt and is documented 
to be positively correlated with crash risk. SIGMAt-1 is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly 
returns over fiscal year t-1, which is a proxy for prior stock return volatility. An increase in volatility is 
associated with an increase in one-year-ahead crash risk (Chen, Hong and Stein, 2001; Kim, Li and Zhang, 
2011a). RETt-1 is the mean of firm-specific weekly returns over year t-1, times 100. Firms with high past 
returns are more prone to price crash in the current year (Chen, Hong and Stein, 2001; Kim, Li and Zhang, 
33
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2011a). Finally, studies document that crash risk is correlated with firm size (SIZEt-1), market-to-book 
ratio (MBt-1), return on assets (ROAt-1), leverage (LEVt-1), information opaqueness (ACCMt-1), and 
bankruptcy risk (Zmijewski’s risk score Zmijewski t-1). Accordingly, we include these variables as controls 
in our model. In addition, we control industry and year fixed effects. H1 predicts that crash risk decreases 
with the quality of internal control. Thus, we expect  to be negative. 
We construct the following regression model to test further the effects of the five components of 
internal control on crash risk: 
PROXY_CRASH=γ0+ γ1CtrEnvt + γ2RISKt + γ3CtrActt + γ4InfoComt + γ5MONITORt 
+γ6DTURNt-1+ γ7NCSKEWt-1+ γ8SIGMAt-1+ γ9RETt-1+ γ10SIZEt-1+ γ11MBt-1+ γ12LEVt-1 
+ γ13ROAt-1+ γ14ACCMt-1+ γ15Zmijewskit-1+ Industry + year +ξt                                                                                         (4) 
Industry and year fixed effects are also controlled in this model. Our hypotheses (H1a to H1e) 
predict that crash risk decreases with the quality of the five components of internal control. Thus, we 
expect γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4, and γ5 to be negative. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics and the correlation table for variables used to test our main 
hypotheses. In Panel A, the mean values of the crash measures CRASHt and NCSKEWt are 0.097 
and -0.199, respectively. Similar to Chen et al. (2013), the mean IC_INDEX is 0.387. Therefore, our 
sample firms receive only 38.7% of the maximum possible scores. The distribution of IC_INDEX is not 
skewed, because the mean value is almost the same as the median value. The mean (median) value for 
CtrEnv is 0.348 (0.331), consistent with the finding of Chen et al. (2013). The mean (median) value for 
RISK is only 0.198 (0.181). Hence, Chinese listed firms are weak at risk assessment. The mean values for 
CtrAct (0.546) and InfoCom (0.495) are higher than those of the other three components. The mean 




Chinese listed firms are ineffective. The average change in monthly trading volume (DTURN) is -0.071. 
The average firm in our sample has a weekly return volatility of 0.054, a firm-specific weekly return 
of -0.160%, a leverage of 0.510, a market-to-book ratio of 3.770, and a return on assets of 0.059. The 
mean absolute value of abnormal accruals is 0.226. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Panel B of Table 2 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for all variables, which is used to test the 
hypotheses. Our measures of the risk of price crash, namely, CRASHt and NCSKEWt, are significantly and 
positively correlated with one another. The correlation coefficient between IC_INDEXt and the measures 
of crash risk (i.e., CRASHt and NCSKEWt) are all significantly negative. This finding supports H1, 
indicating that future crash risk decreases with the quality of internal control. In addition, both proxies for 
crash risk are significantly and positively correlated with DTURNt-1 and MBt-1. 
4.2 Hypothesis tests 
4.2.1 Effects of internal control on crash risk 
Our central hypothesis predicts that companies with better internal control have lower crash risk. 
Table 3 presents the results of hypothesis testing. The IC_INDEX coefficients are uniformly negative and 
significant at 5% or 1% in each of the models, which strongly supports the main hypothesis. Our results 
remain qualitatively unchanged when different measures of crash risk are used, as suggested in prior 
research. The negative IC_INDEX coefficient means that crash risk is lower when internal control is 
stronger. Moreover, our results indicate the economic significance of the effects of internal control on 
crash risk. For example, based on the coefficients in the second regression in Table 3, it is estimated that 
when internal control quality increases from the first to the third quartile, the crash risk proxy NCSKEW 
decreases by 0.034, which is 19.73% of the median value of NCSKEW. Overall, this result suggests that 
companies suffer less price crash when they are equipped with a stronger internal control system. 
The results for the control variables are consistent with expectations and generally consistent with 
the results of prior research. For example, the positive coefficients on lagged return (RETt-1) and lagged 
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market-to-book ratio (MBt-1) in Column (1) and Column (2) are consistent with prior studies on crash risk 
(Chen, Hong and Stein, 2001; Kim, Li and Zhang, 2011a, b; Zhou, Kim, and Yeung, 2014). 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
4.2.2 Effects of the five components of internal control on crash risk 
We further examine the effects of the five components of internal control on crash risk. Table 4 
presents the results of the tests. The coefficients of CtrEnv are negative and significant at the 5% or 1% 
levels in Panels A and B. Thus, the control environment helps reduce crash risk. The InfoCom variable is 
negative and significant at the 5% level in both Columns (4) and (6) in Panel A. For the Monitor variable, 
we find the coefficient negative and significant at the 1% level in both Columns (5) and (6) in Panel B. 
We do not find significantly negative results associated with the RISK and CtrAct variables in either panel. 
Our findings indicate that control environment, information and communication, and monitoring 
components significantly reduce crash risk. In contrast, risk assessment and control activity components 
do not show a relation to crash risk. Overall, among the five components of internal control, control 
environment, monitoring, information and communication are more relevant, while risk assessment and 
control activity components are less relevant in controlling bad news withholding. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
4.2.3 Robustness tests on endogeneity 
Our analysis suggests a negative association between internal control and crash risk. However, our 
empirical tests could suffer from endogeneity problems. Endogeneity can arise because of unobservable 
heterogeneity when unobservable firm-specific factors influence both internal control and crash risk. In 
addition, we use lagged IC_INDEX to mitigate the problem of simultaneity or reverse causality, but we 
remain concerned about the simultaneity because IC_INDEX is sticky across years. Thus, we perform a 
two-stage least square estimation to address these issues. Roberts and Whited (2012) suggest that a proper 
instrument must satisfy both relevance and exclusion conditions. Following these criteria, we use the 
18 
 
average IC_INDEX of other firms in the same industry as the instrumental variable. We report the results 
of the instrumental variable approach in Panel A in Table 5. The coefficients on the fitted value of the 
internal control index (IC_INDEX_HAT) are significantly negative for both measures of crash risk. Thus, 
the negative association between internal control and crash risk holds after controlling for endogeneity 
based on the instrumental variable methodology. 
In addition, we use internal control quality in the preceding period to assuage the potential 
simultaneity problem. We report the results in Panel B of Table 5. The coefficients on IC_INDEXt-1 are 
significantly negative for both measures for crash risk. Thus, the negative association between internal 
control and crash risk holds after using lagged internal control quality to assuage the simultaneity problem. 
Following Zhou, Kim, and Yeung (2014), we include determinants of internal control quality as 
additional control variables in our regression to mitigate the endogeneity problem. These variables 
include the proportion of loss years in the prior three years (LOSS), foreign sales (FSALE), number of 
business segments (SEGMENTS), restructuring charge (RESTRUCTURE), big four audit (BIG4), and 
auditor change (AUDCHANGE). The definitions of these variables are in Appendix B. We report the 
results in Panel C of Table 5. The coefficients on IC_INDEX are significantly negative for both measures 
of crash risk. Thus, the negative association between internal control and future crash risk holds after 
including additional control variables to assuage the endogeneity problem. 
Finally, we include firm fixed effects to account for unobservable, time invariant, firm-specific 
factors that may affect crash risk, to assuage the endogeneity problem. We report the results in Panel D of 
Table 5. The coefficients on IC_INDEX are significantly negative for both measures of crash risk. Thus, 
our results are robust to including firm fixed effects. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
4.3 Additional tests 
Section 4.2 above suggests that internal controls affect crash risk by either limiting bad news 
withholding behavior or by reducing the probability of extreme negative events. In this section, we select 
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factors that can influence the effects of internal control mechanisms on the bad news withholding 
behavior of managers and the effects of extreme negative events. We further investigate whether these 
factors affect the association between internal control and crash risk as our predicted directions. We select 
auditing as internal governance and market development as external governance mechanisms that can 
substitute for internal control in reducing crash risk. Accounting conservatism is selected to proxy firm 
ability to limit bad news withholding. Finally, ownership structure is selected as a factor that can affect 
the ability of firms to mitigate the effects of extreme negative events. For brevity, the results for 
additional tests are confined to the internal control index rather than the components. 
4.3.1 Effect of Big Four audit firms 
Companies must be audited to protect market participants. Prior studies show that auditors monitor 
financial reporting preparation (Becker et al., 1998; Lennox and Pittman, 2010) and provide advice on the 
internal control of companies. We test the role of auditor monitoring in the association between internal 
control and crash risk in this section. Dye (1993) indicates that the expected cost of litigation is greater for 
Big Four auditors than for non-Big Four auditors, especially when companies are bankrupt. Thus, Big 
Four auditors may have strong incentives to push companies to disclose bad news in a timely manner and 
to provide suggestions to help companies minimize the emergence and effects of extreme negative events. 
Internal control can play an important role in reducing crash risk when high-quality auditing is 
unavailable. Therefore, we predict that the auditor substitutes for internal control in lowering crash risk. 
We divide the sample into two subsamples based on whether the auditor is a Big Four firm. As 
shown in Table 6, the coefficients of IC_INDEXt are negative and significant when firms are audited by 
non-Big Four auditors (BIG4 = 0) in Columns (2) and (4). In contrast, the same set of coefficients for 
firms with Big Four auditors (BIG4 = 1) is not significant.
5
 Overall, this result suggests that the auditor is 
likely to serve as a substitute for internal control in reducing crash risk. 
                                                          
5
 In Column (1) of Table 6, when BIG4 = 1, the estimated coefficient of IC_INDEX is insignificant. However, we 
notice that the coefficient of  IC_INDEX  is -3.135 in Column (1) and -1.116 in Column (2).  Therefore, we need to 
be cautious when interpret the results.  
20 
 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
4.3.2 Effect of market development 
China has great disparities in external monitoring mechanisms across regions. We further explore 
whether regional differences in external monitoring affect the association between internal control and 
crash risk. We use the regional marketization index, which measures the progress of institutional 
transformation in the 31 provinces of China.
6
 Additionally, we identify differences in institutions and 
economic policies across provinces. Fan, Wang, and Ma (2011) provide the indices across the 31 
provinces. A high index value indicates a better external monitoring environment. We argue that strong 
external monitoring mechanisms substitute for internal control systems in reducing crash risk. Thus, we 
predict that the negative association between internal control and crash risk is more pronounced for firms 
in provinces with low market development than those in provinces with high market development. 
We divide the sample into two subsamples based on whether a firm is located in a province with a 
marketization index lower than the sample median. As shown in Table 7, the coefficients of IC_INDEXt 
are all negative and significant when the firms are in provinces with low market development (MKT = 0). 
In contrast, the same set of coefficients for firms in provinces with high market development (MKT = 1) is 
insignificant. Overall, the results suggest that the association between internal control and crash risk is 
significantly negative, mainly in provinces with weak external monitoring (i.e., lower market 
development). 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
4.3.3 Effect of conditional accounting conservatism 
Conditional accounting conservatism is interpreted as capturing accountants’ tendency to require a 
higher degree of verification to recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses (Basu, 
1997). This asymmetric verifiability requirement of accounting conservatism weakens managers’ 
                                                          
6
 This index reflects the institutional heterogeneity across regions in China. This index has been widely used in 
studies, such as Wang, Wong, and Xia (2008), Chan, Lin and Wang (2012), and Hung, Wong, and Zhang (2012). 
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incentive and ability to overstate performance and suppress the disclosure of bad news (Watts, 2003; 
Kothari et al., 2010). Kim and Zhang (2015) document that firms with more conservative accounting 
policies have lower likelihood of future stock price crashes. We expect that firms applying less 
accounting conservatism accumulate more negative news and thus are more vulnerable to extreme 
negative events because their ability to absorb negative news is weaker. Thus, we expect that the negative 
association between internal control quality and crash risk is more pronounced for firms applying less 
accounting conservatism. 
To capture firm-year level conservatism, we follow Kim and Zhang (2015) and Khan and Watts 
(2009) and use the following model: 
   (5) 
where X is net income scaled by lagged market value of equity; R is compound returns over the 12-month 
period ending at fiscal yearend; D is an indicator that equals 1 if the return is negative, zero otherwise; 
MKV is the natural log of market value; MB is the ratio of market value to book value of equity; LEV is 
debt-to-equity ratio; i indexes firm; and ε is the residual. We then calculate CSCORE using the following 
model: 
                                (6) 
We build a dummy variable HCON, which equals 1 if CSCORE of the preceding fiscal year is above the 
sample median, zero otherwise, and we divide the sample into two subsamples based on whether 
accounting conservatism is above the sample median. As shown in Table 8, the coefficients of 
IC_INDEXt are all negative and significant for firms applying less accounting conservatism (HCON = 0). 
In contrast, the same set of coefficients for firms applying more accounting conservatism (HCON = 1) is 
insignificant. Overall, the results suggest that firms with less accounting conservatism are more 
susceptible to the effect of internal control on crash risk. 
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[Insert Table 8 Here] 
4.3.4 Effect of ownership 
Prior studies report that SOEs can receive aid from the government when they are affected by 
extreme negative events. SOEs can receive support from the government and attempt to avoid crash risk 
when they are affected by extreme negative events because of weak internal control. Thus, we predict that 
the negative association between internal control and crash risk is more pronounced for non-SOEs than 
SOEs. 
We divide the sample into two subsamples based on whether a firm is state owned. As shown in 
Table 9, the coefficients of IC_INDEXt are all negative and significant for non-SOEs (SOE = 0). In 
contrast, the same set of coefficients for SOEs (SOE = 1) is insignificant. Overall, our results indicate that 
the association between internal control and crash risk is confined to non-SOEs.  
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
5. Conclusion 
We investigate whether internal control and its five components affect crash risk. Consistent with 
our prediction, we find that the quality of internal control is negatively associated with crash risk. Our 
results are robust to alternative proxies for crash risk and different econometric designs. Our results are 
consistent with the notion that internal control can curtail executive withholding of bad news, so that the 
likelihood of a stock price crash is less. 
In addition, our findings suggest that not every component of internal control is equal. We document 
that control environment, information and communication, and monitoring components significantly 
reduce crash risk. In contrast, risk assessment and control activity components do not relate to crash risk. 
The differing results from different components of internal control show that, among the five components 
of internal control, control environment, monitoring, and information and communication are more 
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relevant, while risk assessment and control activity components are less relevant in controlling bad news 
withholding. 
We find that internal and external governance moderate the association between internal control 
quality and crash risk.  That is, firms with weak auditing quality and poor market development have lower 
ability to mitigate the effect of extreme negative events. These results are consistent with the notion that 
the role of internal control in reducing crash risk is a partial substitute of high-quality auditing and 
external monitoring. These findings strengthen our conclusions, because they assuage the concern that the 
negative association between internal control and crash risk is driven by firms with both good internal 
control and strong corporate governance. Overall, this study documents evidence supporting the view that 
internal control limits the ability of managers to conceal bad news and helps reduce the probability of 
extreme negative events, which consequently lead to lower crash risk. 
This study adds to the growing literature on internal control and its implications for managers and 
investors. We focus on the unique role of internal control in lowering crash risk and generate evidence on 
the capital market consequences of internal control. We also extend previous studies on crash risk by 
identifying a new factor that is significantly associated with crash risk. Thus, we uncover useful 
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Crash Risk and Bad News Hoarding Cases 
(1) Chongqing Brewer 
The Economic Observer reported Chongqing Brewer’s large drop in stock price on December 16, 2011 
(http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2011/1216/218139.shtml, accessed September 04, 2015). The Economic 
Observer investigated Chongqing Brewery and reported that the firm “is suspiciously secretive with much 
of the key financial and legal data regarding research into a vaccine for Hepatitis B that it is involved 
with.” The disclosure of a transfer of 8% ownership of a Chongqing Brewery subsidiary to two vaccine 
scientists revealed that the transfer might be illegal. This is because the scientists and their employers did 
not sign the transfer agreement. Reporters found that the transfer directly put the ownership of the shares 
in the hands of the son of one of the scientists. Consequently, Chongqing Brewer’s stock price fell more 
than 40% from December 9 to December 15, 2011. This large drop in stock price (stock price crash) is an 
example of the firm deliberately hiding its news of illegal transfer of shares from shareholders and the 
public. 
(2) Yili Group 
Yili Group is a dairy product company in China. In September 2008, Yili had a recall of its milk products 
because its infant formula contained melamine (a toxic chemical normally used in making plastics and 
tanning leather). It was found that suppliers of milk to dairy companies used melamine to disguise diluted 
milk to make protein levels of the milk appear higher than they really were, allowing producers to cut 
costs by diluting their products. Investigations showed that as many as 372 milk-supplying stations had 
been adding the chemical since as early as April 2005. Some believe that executives in Yili Group knew 
the practice of adding the chemical before the news broke and several of these executives received jail 
time. After Yili Group’s recall announcement, its own and competitors’ share prices fell sharply. 
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Specifically, the Yili stock price hit an all-time low on September 17, 2008. The stock price crash in Yili 





Variable Definition of variable 
Crash risk variables: 
CRASHt Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a firm–year that experiences one or 
more firm-specific weekly returns falling 3.2 standard deviations below the mean 
firm-specific weekly return over fiscal year t, with 3.2 chosen to generate 
frequencies of 0.1% in the normal distribution during the fiscal year period, and 
zero otherwise 
NCSKEWt Negative skewness of firm-specific weekly return over fiscal year t 
For both crash risk variables, the firm-specific weekly return (W) is equal to ln(1+residual), where the 
residual is from the following expanded market model regression: 
 
Internal control variables: 
IC_INDEXt Internal Control Index developed by the Xiamen University research group, which 
is published by three authoritative financial newspapers in China (China Securities 
Journal, Shanghai Securities Journal, and Securities Times) once a year 
CtrEnvt Control Environment Component of the Internal Control Index 
RISKt Risk Assessment Component of the Internal Control Index 
CtrActt Control Activities Component of the Internal Control Index  
InfoComt Information and Communication Component of the Internal Control Index 
MONITORt Monitoring Component of the Internal Control Index 
Firm-level controls and conditional variables: 
DTURNt-1 Average monthly share turnover during fiscal year t-1, minus the average monthly 
share turnover during fiscal year t-2, where monthly share turnover is calculated as 
monthly trading volume divided by total number of shares outstanding during the 
month 
NCSKEWt-1 Lagged value of NCSKEWt 
RETt-1 Mean value of the firm-specific-weekly return over the fiscal year t-1, times 100 
LEVt-1 Leverage of the firm is measured by the debt-to-equity ratio over the fiscal year t-1 
i, i 1,i m, -2 2,i m, -1 3,i m, 4,i m, +1 5,i m, +2 ,r = + r + r + r + r + r i            
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MBt-1 Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 
ROAt-1 Income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets at the end of 
fiscal year t-1 
ACCMt-1 Prior three years’ moving sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals, 
where discretionary accruals are estimated from the Modified Jones Model 
(Dechow et al. (1995))  
Zmijevskit-1 Zmijewski’s risk score (Zmijewski (1984)) 
LOSS t-1 The proportion of loss years in the prior three years 
FSALES t-1 An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has foreign sales at the end of fiscal 
year t-1and 0 otherwise  
SEGMENTS t-1 The natural log of one plus the number of reported business segments at the end of 
fiscal year t-1 
RESTRUCTURE t-1 An indicator variable that equals 1 if the restructuring charge is nonzero at the end 
of fiscal year t-1and 0 otherwise  
BIG4 t-1 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big Four auditors 
or their predecessors at the end of fiscal year t-1, zero otherwise 
AUDCHANGE t-1 An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm experiences auditor change in the 
year t-1 and 0 otherwise. 
MKT t-1 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is located in a province with 
marketization index below the sample median, zero otherwise 
HCON t-1 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the extent of accounting conservatism is above 
sample median, zero otherwise; accounting conservatism is proxied by CSCORE, 
which is calculated by following Khan and Watts (2009) and Kim and Zhang 
(2015); higher CSCORE indicates more accounting conservatism 





Construction of Internal Control Index 
We use the Chinese Internal Control Index, which is denoted by IC_INDEX, to measure the quality 
of internal control. All firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and on the Main Section of the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange are included. Specifically, the index uses the COSO components—control 
environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring—as the 
five first-level criteria in internal control.  The final index includes four levels of evaluation criteria, 
consisting of 5 first-level criteria, 24 second-level criteria, 43 third-level criteria, and 144 fourth-level 
criteria. Then, the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is applied to transform the qualitative information 
obtained in the four levels of the evaluation system into a quantitative measurement of a firm’s internal 
control. Details of the AHP analysis are as follows: 
(1) Hierarchy Construction 
The first step is to model the internal control evaluation problem as a hierarchy. First, we analyze the 
decision problem in-depth, extracting relevant factors and determining the relations among different 
factors. Second, we arrange different factors into an analytic hierarchy, in which each factor belongs to a 
particular hierarchy and is assigned to a factor in the upper hierarchy. The internal control evaluation 
system contains five hierarchies in the following top-to-bottom order: overall objectives, sub-objectives, 
standards, sub-standards, and plan executions.  
(2) Judgment Matrix 
After the hierarchy is constructed for evaluation of internal control, pairwise comparisons of the 
same-level items are performed for the sub-objective level, analyzing their relative importance to the 
same assigned elements in the hierarchy above them. Once the comparison is finished, each of the two 
items receives a score according to its relative importance. To perform the pairwise comparisons, we 
establish a judgment matrix according to Saaty’s AHP 1-9 Scale (Saaty, 1988). The AHP 1-9 Scale is 
aimed at enhancing judgment accuracy and, therefore, weight credibility. Delphi method is applied to 
create the judgment matrix. Experts compare the relative importance between two factors and assign a 
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value to each factor based on AHP 1-9 Scale. For example, if control activities is evaluated to “be slightly 
more important” than monitoring, then the value for control activities is 3 while the value of monitoring 
is 1/3. The remainders of the values are given analogously. 
(3) Weight Calculation and Consistency Check 
The objective evaluation method is applied to calculate the weight based on observed values. The 
objective evaluation method uses the variation coefficient that reflects the differences in information 
between items to calculate the weight. We use the aforementioned methods to obtain the weight for each 
item in the hierarchy.  
(4) Calculation of Internal Control Index 
The internal control index is based on the observed values and calculated weights. It is the weighted 
average of each item. For those items whose scores are listed as “To be standardized” at the fourth level, 
the standardized score is calculated as the actual score on this item for the evaluated firm divided by the 
maximum score on the same item from all the listed companies. The weighted average calculation method 
is as follows. 
IC_INDEX = w1IC1+w2IC2+w3IC3+w4IC4+w5IC5 
where IC_INDEX is the overall internal control index, IC1 is the control environment index, IC2 is the risk 
assessment index, IC3 is the control activities index, IC4 is the information and communication index, IC5 
is the monitoring index, and wi is the weight of the i
th







,, )*(1-pi), i=1,2,3,4,5; j=1,2,3,...,n 
where ICi,j is the value of the j
th
 item at the fourth level associated with the i
th
 item at the first level, wi,j is 
the impact of the j
th
 item at the fourth level on the associated i
th
 item at the first level. Pi is the deduction 
ratio of the special category—punishment or other negative events—at the first level. The final internal 




Table 1 Sample selection and industry distribution 
 
              
Panel A: Selection criteria           
Total firm-year observations available on RESSET and CSMAR databases from 2007 to 
2012 10938 
Deduct：       
 Observations in the financial industry  (204) 
 Observations without internal control index (124) 
 Observations with missing data to calculate control variables (2115) 
Final sample         8495 
        
Panel B: Sample composition by industry   
Industry Group  Number         Percentage    
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 139 1.64%     
Mining 212 2.50%     
Manufacturing 5040 59.33%     
Utilities 407 4.79%     
Construction 157 1.85%     
Transportation 351 4.13%     
Information and Technology 428 5.04%     
Wholesale trade 561 6.60%     
Real estate 623 7.33%     
Services 234 2.75%     
Entertainment 34 0.40%     
Conglomerates 309 3.64%     
Total 8495 100.00%     
              
 
Panel C: Sample composition by year 
Year Number Percentage 
2007 1176 13.84% 
2008 1257 14.80% 
2009 1374 16.17% 
2010 1451 17.08% 
2011 1506 17.73% 
2012 1731 20.38% 






Table 2 Descriptive statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev Q1 Q3 
CRASHt  8495 0.097  0.000  0.296  0.000  0.000  
NCSKEWt 8495 -0.199  -0.180  0.642  -0.567  0.205  
IC_INDEXt 8495 0.387  0.387  0.106  0.311  0.459  
CtrEnvt 8495 0.348  0.331  0.150  0.257  0.453  
RISKt 8495 0.198  0.181  0.141  0.096  0.258  
CtrActt 8495 0.546  0.552  0.164  0.421  0.669  
InfoComt 8495 0.495  0.478  0.120  0.417  0.534  
MONITORt 8495 0.344  0.334  0.185  0.190  0.467  
DTURNt-1 8495 -0.071  -0.052  0.476  -0.355  0.261  
NCSKEWt-1  8495 -0.188  -0.171  0.619  -0.549  0.200  
SIGMAt-1 8495 0.054  0.052  0.018  0.041  0.064  
RETt-1 8495 -0.160  -0.131  0.110  -0.205  -0.083  
SIZEt-1 8495 8.234  8.109  1.048  7.513  8.835  
LEVt-1 8495 0.510  0.515  0.214  0.362  0.649  
MBt-1 8495 3.770  2.924  3.469  1.787  4.763  
ROAt 8495 0.059  0.047  0.091  0.016  0.092  
ACCMt-1 8495 0.226  0.182  0.163  0.110  0.292  





Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1)CRASHt  1.00  0.48  -0.02  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  0.03  -0.01  -0.03  0.02  0.01  -0.02  0.05  -0.02  0.01  0.01  
(2)NCSKEWt  1.00  -0.12  -0.07  -0.08  -0.09  -0.06  -0.13  0.16  0.08  0.10  -0.10  0.04  0.01  0.10  0.00  0.01  0.03  
(3)IC_INDEXt   1.00  0.76  0.61  0.73  0.57  0.70  -0.22  -0.10  -0.32  0.30  0.40  -0.11  -0.04  0.15  -0.04  -0.18  
(4)CtrEnvt    1.00  0.27  0.38  0.32  0.32  -0.10  -0.03  -0.14  0.14  0.40  -0.08  0.00  0.16  -0.05  -0.15  
(5)RISKt     1.00  0.34  0.28  0.40  -0.13  -0.07  -0.25  0.23  0.23  0.00  -0.09  0.05  0.00  -0.05  
(6)CtrActt      1.00  0.32  0.42  -0.21  -0.07  -0.27  0.25  0.23  -0.15  -0.06  0.13  -0.04  -0.20  
(7)InfoComt       1.00  0.26  -0.11  -0.06  -0.16  0.15  0.26  -0.06  0.01  0.09  -0.02  -0.11  
(8)MONITORt        1.00  -0.21  -0.14  -0.32  0.29  0.19  -0.07  -0.02  0.04  -0.01  -0.07  
(9)DTURNt-1         1.00  -0.06  0.35  -0.35  0.06  0.11  0.12  -0.03  -0.05  0.03  
(10)NCSKEWt-1           1.00  0.04  -0.01  -0.09  0.02  -0.05  -0.04  -0.01  0.04  
(11)SIGMAt-1           1.00  -0.98  -0.07  0.12  0.29  -0.05  0.09  0.12  
(12)RETt-1            1.00  0.05  -0.12  -0.29  0.06  -0.08  -0.12  
(13)SIZEt-1             1.00  -0.06  0.18  0.26  -0.02  -0.14  
(14)LEVt-1              1.00  -0.06  -0.23  0.17  0.65  
(15)MBt-1               1.00  0.15  0.07  -0.04  
(16)ROAt                1.00  0.06  -0.40  
(17)ACCMt-1                 1.00  0.17  
(18)Zmijevski t-1                                   1.00  
Notes: This table reports summary statistics and correlations for the sample. Panel A of this table presents summary statistics for the main research variables. Panel B 
of this table presents the correlation matrix of the main research variables. Bold text in Panel B indicates significance at the 0.05 level or better (two-tailed). See 
Appendix B for the details of variable definitions. 
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Table 3 The Effect of Internal Control on Crash Risk (H1) 
 CRASHt  NCSKEWt 
Variable Coef. χ
2
  Coef. t-value 
IC_INDEXt -0.926** 3.85   -0.228*** -2.69  
DTURNt-1 0.015 0.02   0.025 1.16  
NCSKEWt-1 0.002  0.00   0.079***  6.60  
SIGMAt-1 -46.24*** 21.37   1.339  0.67  
RETt-1 -5.114*** 9.81   0.292  0.90  
SIZEt-1 0.048 1.09   0.049*** 5.82  
LEVt-1 -0.551** 5.44   -0.037 -0.82  
MBt-1 0.048*** 16.90   0.009***  3.64  
ROAt -1.315** 5.78   -0.087  -0.96  
ACCMt-1 0.312  1.38   0.073  1.56  
Zmijewski t-1 0.350  1.16   0.130** 2.12  
Constant -0.900*  2.98   -0.729*** -7.20  
INDUSTRY Yes  Yes 
YEAR Yes  Yes 
Adj.R
2
/-2 Log L  5270.445  0.086 
Observations 8495   8495 
 
Notes: The dependent variables in the table are proxies for crash risk, which are CRASH and NCSKEW respectively. 
CRASH equals one if a firm experiences one or more firm-specific weekly returns (i.e., Wi,τ) falling 3.2 standard 
deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns for that fiscal year. NCSKEW is computed by taking the 
negative of third moment of returns and dividing it by the standard deviation of returns raised to the third power. 
IC_INDEX is constructed by the internal control research center of Xiamen University. The values of IC_INDEX 
range from 0 to 1 and a higher value of IC_INDEX corresponds to higher quality of internal control.  See Appendix B 
for the definitions of other variables. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering by firm. ***, **, and * denote 




Table 4 The Effect of the Five Components of Internal Control on Crash Risk (H1a – H1e) 
Panel A: Dependent Variable-CRASHt       
  Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) Column(5) Column(6) 













CtrEnvt  -0.721** 5.83          -0.664** 4.56  
RISKt    -0.365  1.41        0.210  0.42  
CtrActt      -0.342  1.65      0.172  0.37  
InfoComt        -0.767** 4.91    -0.820** 5.05  
MONITORt          -0.632*** 7.59  -0.070  0.08  
DTURNt-1  0.003  0.00  0.001  0.00  -0.007  0.00  0.010  0.01  -0.021  0.05  0.000  0.00  
NCSKEWt-1  0.013  0.04  0.035  0.30  0.034  0.28  0.031  0.23  0.018  0.07  0.010  0.02  
SIGMAt-1  -44.356*** 19.75  -15.024 2.13  -14.400  1.98  -13.932  1.86  -17.522* 2.89  -44.084*** 18.75  
RETt-1  -4.921*** 9.06  -1.651 1.00  -1.558  0.90  -1.468  0.80  -1.892  1.32  -4.869*** 8.73  
SIZEt-1  0.054  1.39  0.002  0.00  0.000  0.00  0.011  0.06  0.000  0.00  0.060  1.63  
LEVt-1  -0.544** 5.32  -0.541** 5.43  -0.556** 5.75  -0.543**  5.49  -0.547**  5.60  -0.539** 5.25  
MBt-1  0.047*** 16.16  0.040*** 12.38  0.040*** 12.29  0.041*** 12.76  0.040*** 12.28  0.048*** 16.35  
ROAt  -1.293** 5.56  -1.129** 4.36  -1.089** 4.09  -1.107**  4.25  -1.115** 4.29  -1.285  5.51  
ACCMt-1  0.294  1.23  0.231  0.78  0.228  0.75  0.217  0.69  0.226  0.74  0.283  1.14  
Zmijewski t-1  0.364  1.27  0.443  1.85  0.410  1.57  0.408  1.56  0.433  1.80  0.345  1.11  
Constant  -1.148** 5.04  -1.284** 6.28  -1.165** 4.84  -1.068** 4.16  -1.032** 3.93  -0.924  2.82  
INDUSTRY  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
-2 Log L   5220.108  5220.541 5220.343 5217.170 5214.290 5262.944 








Panel B: Dependent Variable-NCSKEWt                     
  Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) Column(5) Column(6) 




CtrEnvt  -0.177*** -3.34          -0.168*** -3.05  
RISKt    -0.028  -0.54        0.020  0.36  
CtrActt      0.008  0.17      0.081  1.63  
InfoComt        -0.028  -0.44    0.007  0.10  
MONITORt          -0.133***  -3.01  -0.130*** -2.73  
DTURNt-1  0.021  0.99  0.024  1.12  0.023  1.09  0.023  1.09  0.030  1.38  0.027  1.27  
NCSKEWt-1  0.081*** 6.84  0.081*** 6.78  0.081*** 6.80  0.081  6.78*** 0.075*** 6.25  0.077*** 6.37  
SIGMAt-1  1.916  0.95  1.622  0.81  1.735  0.86  1.705  0.85  0.953  0.47  1.397  0.69  
RETt-1  0.353  1.08  0.302  0.93  0.313  0.96  0.311  0.96  0.254  0.78  0.312  0.95  
SIZEt-1  0.050*** 5.93  0.043*** 5.21  0.042*** 5.19  0.042  5.24*** 0.044*** 5.49  0.050 *** 5.75  
LEVt-1  -0.036  -0.80  -0.040  -0.88  -0.042  -0.91  -0.041  -0.89  -0.041  -0.91  -0.037  -0.82  
MBt-1  0.009*** 3.52  0.009*** 3.72  0.010*** 3.74  0.010  3.73*** 0.010*** 3.85  0.009*** 3.67  
ROAt  -0.081  -0.89  -0.098  -1.08  -0.099  -1.08  -0.098  -1.07  -0.096  -1.05  -0.085  -0.94  
ACCMt-1  0.069  1.48  0.077  1.64  0.078  1.64  0.077  1.63  0.078* 1.65  0.071  1.51  
Zmijewski t-1  0.132** 2.17  0.145** 2.38  0.147** 2.39  0.144  2.35** 0.144** 2.36  0.143** 2.32  
Constant  -0.792*** -7.90  -0.774*** -7.74  -0.780*** -7.62  -0.767  -7.51*** -0.718*** -7.07  -0.773*** -7.30  
INDUSTRY  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.R
2
   0.086  0.085  0.085  0.085  0.086  0.087  
Observations   8495 8495 8495 8495 8495 8495 
 
Notes: This table presents the results for effects of the five components of internal control on crash risk. The dependent variables in the table are proxies for crash 
risk, which are CRASH (Panel A) and NCSKEW (Panel B) respectively. CtrEnv, RISK, CtrAct, InfoCom, and MONITOR are the five components separated from 
IC_INDEX, with their values range from 0 to 1. Higher values of the five sub-indexes correspond to higher quality of internal control.  See Appendix B for the 
definitions of other variables. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level or 




Table 5 Regression Analysis to Address Endogeneity Problems 
Panel A: Industry instrumental variable 
  CRASHt  NCSKEWt 
Variable   Coef. Chi2   Coef. t-value 
IC_INDEX_HAT t -6.936** 5.12   -1.623*** -2.71  
DTURNt-1  -0.094  0.78   -0.006  -0.27  
NCSKEWt-1 0.048  0.55   0.090*** 7.64  
SIGMAt-1  -19.507* 3.41   9.057*** 4.25  
RETt-1  -2.378  2.00   1.105*** 3.31  
SIZEt-1  -0.014  0.10   0.034*** 4.35  
LEVt-1  -0.536** 5.30   -0.036  -0.80  
MBt-1  0.038*** 11.17   0.006** 2.56  
ROAt  -1.189** 4.83   -0.053  -0.59  
ACCMt-1  0.228  0.75   0.047  1.03  
Zmijewski t-1 0.431  1.77   0.140** 2.32  
Constant 1.750  1.44   -0.132  -0.47  
INDUSTRY                    Yes                     Yes 
YEAR                    Yes                     Yes 
Adj.R
2
/-2 Log L                5216.239    0.095  
Observations                  8495     8495 
 
Panel B: Lag IC_INDEX 
  CRASHt  NCSKEWt 
Variable   Coef. Chi
2
 Coef. t-value 
IC_INDEXt-1 -0.014*** 6.77  -0.002** -2.50  
DTURNt-1  -0.058  0.32  -0.002  -0.12  
NCSKEWt-1 -0.040  0.32  0.075*** 5.73  
SIGMAt-1  -13.639  1.56  10.115*** 4.65  
RETt-1  -1.046  0.36  1.261*** 3.74  
SIZEt-1  0.044  0.76  0.057*** 6.36  
LEVt-1  -0.514** 4.19  -0.054  -1.14  
MBt-1  0.045*** 15.38  0.008*** 3.32  
ROAt  -0.709  1.49  0.164* 1.67  
ACCMt-1  0.320  1.39  0.068  1.38  
Zmijewski t-1 0.663* 3.68  0.233*** 3.77  
Constant  -1.304** 5.10  -0.955*** -8.78  
INDUSTRY Yes Yes 
YEAR  Yes Yes 
Adj.R
2
/-2 Log L  4443.294 0.092  
Observations 7308 7308 









Panel C: include  internal control quality variable 
  CRASHt  NCSKEWt 
Variable   Coef. Chi
2
 Coef. t-value 
IC_INDEXt  -1.336*** 7.21  -0.278*** -3.35  
DTURNt-1  -0.021  0.04  0.013  0.63  
NCSKEWt-1  -0.006  0.01  0.079*** 6.59  
SIGMAt-1  -12.704  1.47  9.830*** 4.71  
RETt-1  -1.267  0.57  1.271*** 3.88  
SIZEt-1  0.015  0.09  0.045*** 5.07  
LEVt-1  -0.466* 3.80  -0.025  -0.54  
MBt-1  0.042*** 11.92  0.006** 2.43  
ROAt  -0.904  2.14  0.059  0.62  
ACCMt-1  0.155  0.34  0.025  0.52  
Zmijewski t-1  0.422  1.52  0.101  1.55  
LOSSt  -0.126  0.25  0.100** 2.30  
FSALESt  -0.279  0.63  -0.117* -1.78  
SEGMENTSt  -0.036  0.46  -0.013  -1.48  
RESTRUCTUREt  -0.051  0.37  -0.023  -1.39  
BIG4t  0.209  1.41  0.014  0.43  
AudChangt  0.113  0.63  0.000  -0.01  
Constant   -0.934  2.69  -0.756*** -7.25  
INDUSTRY  Yes Yes 
YEAR  Yes Yes 
Adj.R
2
/-2 Log L   4933.766 0.099 
Observations   8124 8124 
Panel D: Firm fixed effect 
  CRASHt  NCSKEWt 
Variable   Coef. Chi2   Coef. t-value 
IC_INDEXt -2.373***  8.43   -0.377***  -3.16  
DTURN t-1  0.092  0.23   -0.034  -1.43  
NCSKEW t-1 -0.642***  48.62   -0.111***  -9.00  
SIGMA t-1  -37.591**  5.17   2.845  1.22  
RET t-1  -2.970 1.31   0.198  0.56  
SIZE t-1  0.551***  11.77   0.168***  7.16  
LEV t-1  -1.334*  3.80   0.054  0.65  
MB t-1  0.074***  7.25   0.006*  1.75  
ROA t  -1.789  2.24   -0.557***  -4.73  
ACCM t-1  0.165  0.10   0.006  0.09  
Zmijewski t-1 -0.028  0.00   -0.220**  -2.58  
Firm Yes  Yes 
YEAR  Yes  Yes 
Adj.R2/-2 Log L  3184.003  0.316 
 
Notes: This table presents the analysis to address endogeneity concerns on the effect of internal control on crash risk. 
LOSS is the proportion of loss years in the prior three years.  FSALES equals one if the firm has foreign sales and 




RESTRUCTURE equals one if the firm has experienced a restructure and zero otherwise. BIG4 equals one if the firm 
is audited by one of the Big Four auditors or their predecessors, zero otherwise. AudChang is an indicator, which 
equals one if the firm changed auditor in the year and zero otherwise.  See Appendix B for the definitions of other 
variables. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 




Table 6 The Effect of Audit Quality on the Relationship between Internal Control and Crash Risk 
 CRASHt NCSKEWt 
 Column (1)/BIG4 =1  Column (2)/BIG4 = 0 Column (3)/BIG4=1  Column (4)/BIG4=0 
Variable Coef. χ
2
  Coef. χ
2
 Coef. t-value  Coef. t-value 
IC_INDEXt -3.135 2.14   -1.116** 5.29  0.118 0.40   -0.252*** -2.83  
DTURNt-1 0.300 0.22   -0.030 0.09  0.271*** 3.11   0.006 0.29  
NCSKEWt-1 -0.095 0.11   0.031 0.21  0.042 0.87   0.079*** 6.33  
SIGMAt-1 0.058 0.00   -12.930 1.49  -7.108 -0.88   2.289 1.08  
RETt-1 8.489 0.20   -1.417 0.71  -0.808 -0.51   0.422 1.24  
SIZEt-1 0.030 0.04   0.025 0.22  0.049* 1.86   0.054*** 5.76  
LEVt-1 -2.085* 3.33   -0.470** 4.00  0.014 0.05   -0.033 -0.73  
MBt-1 0.059 0.56   0.038*** 11.06  0.016 1.07   0.009*** 3.54  
ROAt 0.088 0.00   -1.155** 4.29  0.503 1.26   -0.129 -1.38  
ACCMt-1 0.219 0.03   0.209 0.61  0.135 0.70   0.068 1.41  
Zmijewski t-1 1.223 0.46   0.337 1.05  -0.470 -0.97   0.142** 2.40  
Constant -10.256*** 19.81   -1.158** 4.20  -1.033*** -2.99   -0.792*** -7.23  
INDUSTRY Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
YEAR Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Adj.R
2
/-2 Log L  299.215   4883.088  0.151   0.087  
Observations 546   7949 546   7949 
 
Notes: The dependent variables in the table are proxies for crash risk, which are CRASH and NCSKEW respectively. CRASH equals one if a firm experiences one 
or more firm-specific weekly returns (i.e., Wi,τ) falling 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns for that fiscal year. NCSKEW is 
computed by taking the negative of third moment of returns and dividing it by the standard deviation of returns raised to the third power. IC_INDEX is 
constructed by the internal control research center of Xiamen University. The values of IC_INDEX range from 0 to 1 and a higher value of IC_INDEX 
corresponds to higher quality of internal control. CtrEnv, RISK, CtrAct, InfoCom, and MONITOR are the five components separated from IC_INDEX, with their 
values range from 0 to 1. Higher values of the five sub-indexes correspond to higher quality of internal control.  BIG4 equals one if the firm is audited by one of 
the Big Four auditors or their predecessors, zero otherwise.  See Appendix B for the definitions of other variables. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering 




Table 7 The Effect of Marketization on the Relationship between Internal Control and Crash Risk 
 CRASHt NCSKEWt 
 Column(1)/MKT=1  Column(2)/MKT=0 Column (3)/MKT=1   Column (4)/MKT=0 
Variable Coef. χ
2
  Coef. χ
2
 Coef. t-value  Coef. t-value 
IC_INDEXt -0.988 2.22   -1.424** 4.56  -0.102 -1.220   -0.252*** -2.83  
DTURNt-1 -0.100 0.55   0.074 0.24  -0.017 -0.810   0.006 0.29  
NCSKEWt-1 -0.047 0.25   0.087 0.95  0.049*** 4.030   0.079*** 6.33  
SIGMAt-1 -19.205 1.75   -13.006 0.77  4.124** 1.930   2.289 1.08  
RETt-1 -2.249 0.86   -1.091 0.22  0.450 1.300   0.422 1.24  
SIZEt-1 -0.039 0.40   0.089 1.58  0.017** 2.050   0.054*** 5.76  
LEVt-1 -0.445 1.76   -0.503 2.19  -0.003 -0.060   -0.033 -0.73  
MBt-1 0.034* 3.34   0.039*** 7.75  0.004 1.460   0.009*** 3.54  
ROAt -0.621 0.56   -1.306* 3.50  -0.118 -1.210   -0.129 -1.38  
ACCMt-1 -0.147 0.16   0.536 2.02  -0.049 -1.160   0.068 1.41  
Zmijewski t-1 0.266 0.21   0.304 0.57  0.041 0.600   0.142** 2.40  
Constant -0.597 0.73   -1.410* 3.02  -0.418*** -4.280   -0.792*** -7.23  
INDUSTRY Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
YEAR Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Adj.R
2
/-2 Log L  2560.356   2618.595  0.151   0.087  
Observations 4206   4289  4206   4289  
 
Notes: The dependent variables in the table are proxies for crash risk, which are CRASH and NCSKEW respectively. CRASH equals one if a firm experiences one 
or more firm-specific weekly returns (i.e., Wi,τ) falling 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns for that fiscal year. NCSKEW is 
computed by taking the negative of third moment of returns and dividing it by the standard deviation of returns raised to the third power. IC_INDEX is 
constructed by the internal control research center of Xiamen University. The values of IC_INDEX range from 0 to 1 and a higher value of IC_INDEX 
corresponds to higher quality of internal control. CtrEnv, RISK, CtrAct, InfoCom, and MONITOR are the five components separated from IC_INDEX, with their 
values range from 0 to 1. Higher values of the five sub-indexes correspond to higher quality of internal control.  MKT equals one if the firm is located in a 
province with marketization index below the sample median, zero otherwise.  See Appendix B for the definitions of other variables. The standard errors are 




Table 8 The Effect of Accounting Conservatism on the Relationship between Internal Control and Crash Risk 
 CRASHt  NCSKEWt 
 Column(1)/HCon=1  Column(2)/ HCon =0  Column(3)/ HCon =1   Column(4) HCon =0 
Variable Coef. Chi
2
  Coef. Chi
2
  Coef. t-value  Coef. t-value 
IC_INDEXt -0.764  1.46   -1.087*  2.73   -0.163  -1.51   -0.329***  -2.69  
DTURNt-1 0.200  0.99   -0.157  1.67   0.022  0.66   0.023  0.83  
NCSKEWt-1 0.106  1.35   -0.038  0.17   0.104***  6.74   0.065***  3.70  
SIGMAt-1 -34.576**  5.09   -11.228  0.56   6.063*  1.95   2.649  0.96  
RETt-1 -4.877**  4.05   -0.407  0.03   0.693  1.37   0.554  1.28  
SIZEt-1 -0.097  2.07   0.122*  3.39   0.042***  3.63   0.074***  5.59  
LEVt-1 -0.318  0.86   -0.556*  2.96   0.058  0.89   -0.191***  -2.93  
MBt-1 0.032**  3.89   0.067***  13.73   0.004  1.26   0.008*  1.95  
ROAt -0.989  1.84   -1.477*  3.59   -0.256**  -2.11   0.218  1.64  
ACCMt-1 -0.112  0.08   0.534  2.30   -0.021  -0.32   0.138**  2.02  
Zmijewski t-1 0.480  1.32   0.330  0.46   0.090  1.08   0.222**  2.55  
Constant -0.167  0.05   -1.925**  6.70   -0.920***  -6.13   -0.886***  -6.07  
INDUSTRY Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
YEAR Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj.R
2
/-2 Log L  2533.168  2631.698  0.096  0.101 
Observations 4248   4247   4245   4250 
 
Notes: The dependent variables in the table are proxies for crash risk, which are CRASH and NCSKEW respectively. CRASH equals one if a firm experiences one 
or more firm-specific weekly returns (i.e., Wi,τ) falling 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns for that fiscal year. NCSKEW is 
computed by taking the negative of third moment of returns and dividing it by the standard deviation of returns raised to the third power. IC_INDEX is 
constructed by the internal control research center of Xiamen University. The values of IC_INDEX range from 0 to 1 and a higher value of IC_INDEX 
corresponds to higher quality of internal control. CtrEnv, RISK, CtrAct, InfoCom, and MONITOR are the five components separated from IC_INDEX, with their 
values range from 0 to 1. Higher values of the five sub-indexes correspond to higher quality of internal control.  HCon equals one if the extent of accounting 
conservatism is above sample median, zero otherwise. Accounting conservatism is proxied by CSCORE which is calculated by following Khan and Watts (2009) 
and Kim and Zhang (2015). A higher CSCORE indicates more accounting conservatism.  See Appendix B for the definitions of other variables. The standard 




Table 9 The Effect of Ownership on the Relationship between Internal Control and Crash Risk 
 CRASHt NCSKEWt 
 Column(1)/SOE=1  Column(2)/SOE=0 Column (3)/SOE=1   Column (4)/SOE=0 
Variable Coef. Chi
2
  Coef. Chi
2
 Coef. t-value  Coef. t-value 
IC_INDEXt -0.109 0.03   -2.090*** 7.55  -0.007 -0.06   -0.555*** -3.76  
DTURNt-1 0.130 0.57   0.017 0.01  0.079*** 2.68   -0.016 -0.53  
NCSKEWt-1 0.055 0.38   -0.072 0.50  0.087*** 5.88   0.064*** 3.21  
SIGMAt-1 -36.895*** 7.36   -59.524*** 15.48  2.263 0.91   0.176 0.05  
RETt-1 -3.690* 2.88   -7.039*** 7.93  0.341 0.84   0.275 0.51  
SIZEt-1 0.020 0.11   0.110 2.03  0.041*** 3.83   0.080*** 5.46  
LEVt-1 -0.590* 3.30   -0.234 0.43  -0.053 -0.85   0.028 0.40  
MBt-1 0.063*** 14.86   0.036** 4.63  0.012*** 3.51   0.008** 2.27  
ROAt -1.326* 2.79   -1.488* 3.51  -0.250* -1.85   -0.025 -0.20  
ACCMt-1 -0.319 0.62   0.684* 3.58  0.000 0.01   0.099 1.37  
Zmijewski t-1 0.672 2.39   -0.303 0.32  0.046 0.53   0.161* 1.80  
Constant -1.084 2.46   -0.906 1.16  -0.759*** -5.97   -0.808*** -4.72  
INDUSTRY Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
YEAR Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Adj.R
2
/-2 Log L  3022.141   2184.540  0.103   0.080  
Observations 5115   3380 5115    3380  
 
Notes: The dependent variables in the table are proxies for crash risk, which are CRASH and NCSKEW respectively. CRASH equals one if a firm experiences one 
or more firm-specific weekly returns (i.e., Wi,τ) falling 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns for that fiscal year. NCSKEW is 
computed by taking the negative of third moment of returns and dividing it by the standard deviation of returns raised to the third power. IC_INDEX is 
constructed by the internal control research center of Xiamen University. The values of IC_INDEX range from 0 to 1 and a higher value of IC_INDEX 
corresponds to higher quality of internal control. CtrEnv, RISK, CtrAct, InfoCom, and MONITOR are the five components separated from IC_INDEX, with their 
values range from 0 to 1. Higher values of the five sub-indexes correspond to higher quality of internal control.  SOE equals one if the firm is state-owned, zero 
otherwise.  See Appendix B for the definitions of other variables. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level or better, respectively (two tailed). 
 
